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•	 	It	is	important	that	fiscal	measures	that	are	not	explicitly	‘green’	
do not make achieving climate change goals more difficult by 
subsidising greenhouse gas emissions or locking in high-carbon 
infrastructure for decades to come.
•	 	An	effective	set	of	policies	to	combat	climate	change	requires	
several components. One component is the promotion of energy 
efficiency and low-carbon technologies. That gives a lot of scope 
for targeted and timely public spending measures. Many energy 
efficiency measures would be particularly effective as part of a 
fiscal	stimulus,	as	they	could	be	implemented	quickly	and	would	
be relatively labour-intensive.
•	 	Another	component	is	carbon	pricing.	This	element	of	policy	
has weakened, judging by the fall in the price at which carbon 
quotas	are	traded	–	a	fall	reflecting	the	impact	of	the	economic	
slowdown	and	efforts	by	quota	holders	to	raise	funds.	
•	 	Together	with	the	reductions	in	oil	and	other	hydrocarbon	prices,	
this weakness risks sending the wrong signals to firms and 
households about the merits of low-carbon investment options 
and low-carbon goods and services. That makes the third 
element	of	climate	change	policies	–	building	confidence	in	the	
long-term	framework	for	greenhouse	gas	reductions	–	all	the	
more important.
•	 	It	is	difficult	to	be	precise	about	the	appropriate	size	of	the	‘green’	
element of the necessary global fiscal stimulus. But a case can 
be	made	for	a	‘ball-park’	figure	of	some	US$400	billion	of	extra	
public	spending	worldwide	on	‘green’	measures	over	the	next	
year or so. Unblocking the financial system will allow the private 
sector in due course to finance a greater share of the continuing 
investment	in	‘greening’	the	economy	that	will	be	necessary.
•	 	It	is	vital	that	the	rationale	for	a	comprehensive	framework	
to reduce emissions is explained and the case for it made 
vigorously, given the need to reconcile continuing measures 
against climate change with eventual fiscal consolidation. If 
people become convinced that the framework will hold in the 
long term, that could unleash a wave of creativity and innovation 
in	‘greening’	the	economy	–	a	more	durable	foundation	for	
economic growth than dot.com booms and housing bubbles.
•	 	But	the	long-term	credibility	of	the	framework	requires	that	the	
shape of the post-Kyoto policy regime is made clear as soon 
as possible. If industrial countries take the opportunity to delay 
action on climate change, that could impair their credibility 
and undermine agreement at the UNFCCC conference in 
Copenhagen in December 2009, damaging the signals crucial for 
fostering low-carbon investment.
•	 	Decisions	about	the	scale	and	composition	of	fiscal	expansions	
are needed as soon as possible if they are to play their role in 
preventing a slide into a global depression. Governments need to 
commit	to	a	strong	‘green’	element	in	a	fiscal	recovery	plan	in	the	
first	half	of	2009	or	indeed	the	first	quarter.
 
•	  There is a growing consensus among policy-makers around the 
world that the great risks arising from climate change brought 
about by human activities require strong cuts in emissions and 
that strong action is urgently needed. Nevertheless, the global 
slowdown in economic growth has raised the question, might it 
be better to delay such action until the world economy recovers? 
•	  We argue, no. If the appropriate mix of policies is adopted, 
action to tackle climate change could form a central part of a 
fiscal package designed to moderate the economic slowdown. 
A ‘green’ fiscal stimulus can provide an effective boost to the 
economy, increasing labour demand in a timely fashion, while at 
the same time building the foundations for sound, sustainable and 
strong growth in the future. Our argument proceeds as follows:
•	 	There	has	been	a	sharp	deterioration	in	the	near-term	economic	
outlook	for	both	industrial	and	developing	countries.	A	fiscal	
stimulus is part of the appropriate response because the 
downturn has been driven by decelerating demand.
•	 	Fiscal	policy	is	not	always	the	right	tool	to	use	for	countercyclical	
purposes. But the comparative advantage of monetary policy 
is less evident in current circumstances. Past experience gives 
some guidance as to when active fiscal policy is likely to be more 
effective, giving support to the case for a stimulus in industrial 
countries now.
•	 	Fixing	the	global	financial	system	is	also	a	top	priority	at	present,	
to	restore	effective	financial	intermediation	and	boost	the	flow	of	
credit	(including	to	‘green’	projects).
•	 	Given	the	uncertainties	at	this	point,	it	makes	sense	to	implement	
a diverse set of measures, but with the emphasis on spending 
increases	rather	than	across-the-board	tax	cuts.	A	good	fiscal	
stimulus should be targeted, timely and temporary. It is important 
that measures do not bring the long-term credibility of fiscal 
frameworks	into	question.	That	is	more	of	a	challenge	in	some	
countries than others, so the scale of the stimulus should vary 
according to local circumstances.
•	 	Action	on	climate	change	remains	urgent.	If	policy-makers	were	
to put action off until the impacts of climate change forced the 
issue to the top of the political agenda, the stock of greenhouse 
gases	that	would	have	built	up	in	the	atmosphere	as	the	flows	of	
emissions accumulated would entail severe and increasing risks 
for many decades.
•	 	From	the	perspective	of	the	economic	management	of	these	
risks, it makes sense for world emissions to be reduced by at 
least 50% from 1990 levels by 2050 and for the developed world 
to aim to bring its emissions down by at least 80%, given past 
history and its access to resources and technologies. That will 
require	the	developed	world	as	a	whole	to	implement	deep	cuts	
by 2020 to reach the path to this long-term objective.
•	 	The	objectives	of	economic	recovery	and	urgent	action	on	
climate	change	complement	each	other.	‘Green’	measures	can	be	
targeted	and	timely.	We	offer	in	Table	1	a	qualitative	assessment	
of the merits of various specific measures. Some can be brought 
forward from medium-term plans to the short term or are one-off 
adjustments. Others will need to continue into the long term and 
hence	will	require	funding	arrangements	when	fiscal	deficits	are	
reined in, as they will have to be.
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2. The need for a fiscal stimulus1. Introduction
Why is a fiscal stimulus appropriate?
The case for a fiscal stimulus rests on the diagnosis of the cause 
of the current economic downturn. The evidence suggests that it 
reflects	unusually	strong	adverse	shocks	to	aggregate	demand.	
There has been a sharp deterioration in the outlook for both 
industrial and developing countries, notably in the United States, 
driven by decelerating demand. 
For	example,	staff	at	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	have	
concluded that “the current crisis, which started in the housing and 
financial sectors, has now led to a strong fall in aggregate demand. 
There are indications that this fall could be larger than in any period 
since the Great Depression.” (4) In the UK, HM Treasury has noted 
that “between the summer of 2007 and summer 2008, the world 
economy	progressively	suffered	from	the	unprecedented	confluence	
of two major economic shocks (credit crisis and commodity price 
surge).”	The	argument	is	that	discretionary	increases	in	government	
spending are able to offset, at least in part, the decline in 
private-sector demand. 
Already,	policy-makers	around	the	world	have	started	to	prepare	
such increases, as in the UK Pre-Budget Report presented to 
Parliament	on	24	November	2008.	The	Managing	Director	of	the	
IMF suggested in December that, for the G20 countries, a stimulus 
amounting to around 2% of GDP would be appropriate. The IMF has 
emphasized	the	need	for	a	collective	approach	to	avoid	‘beggar	thy	
neighbour’	measures	such	as	competitive	devaluations.	
At	the	same	time,	governments	have	been	seeking	ways	of	repairing	
the global financial system. Without financial intermediation working 
properly, the prospects for private demand growth taking over the 
baton from public spending increases speedily are poor. This paper 
focuses on the case for a fiscal stimulus, rather than the case for 
measures to mend the financial system, because the synergies with 
policies to tackle climate change are more evident for the former. 
But we acknowledge the urgent need for the latter. Indeed, they 
are vital if, among other objectives, project finance for large-scale 
low-carbon energy infrastructure is to become available again 
at a sufficient scale.
Some counter-arguments
The stirring of fiscal activism marks a break from recent economic 
orthodoxy, which has generally held that monetary policy is the 
appropriate	tool	to	use	for	countercyclical	purposes.	Taylor	(2000),	
for example, identified several advantages for monetary policy 
compared with fiscal policy. He pointed out that the lag between 
observing shocks to the economy and changing the policy 
instrument is usually much shorter for monetary policy; reversing 
policy changes in response to new information is much easier and 
political inertia is less of a problem. 
And	he	observed	that,	in	the	United	States,	discretionary	fiscal	policy	
had not been countercyclical in practice. 
There are also other potential problems with an activist fiscal policy. 
In	particular,	it	can	crowd	out	private	spending	–	directly,	or	by	
pushing up the cost of labour and other inputs to production, or 
by leading to higher interest rates and thus an appreciation of the 
exchange rate. Tax cuts will be ineffective if taxpayers anticipate 
fully the increased taxes that will have to be paid in the future if the 
government’s	intertemporal	budget	constraint	is	to	be	satisfied.	(5) 
And	if	lenders	to	government	begin	to	suspect	that	the	government	
may not have the capacity to repay the real value of public-sector 
debt	in	full,	default	risk	premia	and/or	inflation	premia	on	government	
bonds may rise sharply, exacerbating the tightening of credit 
conditions.	Another	critique	of	activist	fiscal	policy	is	the	proposition	
that business cycles are not very costly and hence macroeconomic 
policy activism is unnecessary. (6) Some have gone further, arguing 
that downturns weed out inefficient firms and bring about innovative 
change.
The riposte of fiscal activists
However, many sceptics accept that there are circumstances when 
active fiscal policy is appropriate. Taylor, for example, discusses 
the case where the nominal interest rate is approaching its lower 
bound	of	zero,	so	that	monetary	policy	is	less	easy	to	implement,	
particularly if the general level of prices is expected to fall. That 
scenario became relevant in Japan a decade ago and in recent 
months more widely.(7) Moreover, because credit market problems 
have made the monetary transmission mechanism from the central 
banks’	actions	to	activity	less	effective	and	less	predictable,	the	
comparative advantage of monetary policy has been reduced. It 
can, however, support active fiscal policy by preventing nominal 
interest rates rising in response to a fiscal expansion, turning off the 
mechanism that leads to crowding out.
Second, some of the theoretical assumptions made in the case 
against fiscal activism do not hold in practice. For example, Ricciuti 
(2003)	surveys	studies	of	whether	so-called	Ricardian	equivalence	
holds and concludes that it does not, so that tax cuts are likely 
to affect activity, particularly when many agents in the economy 
are credit constrained and are therefore unable to smooth their 
consumption	over	time	–	a	problem	that	has	become	particularly	
acute in the UK because of the stresses on the banking system. 
Temporary public spending increases should not crowd out private 
consumption	fully	even	if	Ricardian	equivalence	does	hold,	
because consumers will seek to smooth their spending over time. 
As	far	as	the	costs	of	business	cycle	fluctuations	are	concerned,	
these have been considerably higher than originally suggested 
by Lucas and others.(8)
There is a growing consensus among policy-makers around the 
world that the climate change brought about by human activities 
needs to be halted. Many countries have adopted long-term 
objectives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions sharply to achieve 
this end. The United Kingdom, for example, enshrined in law last 
November the objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
by 80% by 2050.(1) President Obama is also pursuing a 80% 
reduction in United States emissions by 2050, although the details 
and timeframe of legislative proposals are yet to be finalised. The 
European Union is seeking to reduce emissions by 30% by 2020 if 
an international agreement on cuts is achieved, and by 20% even if 
it	is	not.	The	UN	climate	summit	in	Poznán	last	December	concluded	
with a general recognition that emissions need to peak and start to 
decline within the next 10 to 15 years. 
But these aspirations do not by themselves pin down what policy-
makers need to do in the next couple of years to meet them. The 
global	slowdown	in	economic	growth	has	raised	the	question,	might	
it be better to delay strong actions against climate change until the 
world economy recovers? Before the European Union summit in 
October 2008, eight EU members suggested that carbon dioxide 
emissions targets ought to be revised in the light of current “serious 
economic and financial uncertainties.”(2) The Prime Minister of Italy 
told a press conference “our businesses are in absolutely no position 
at the moment to absorb the costs of the regulations that have 
been	proposed.”	The	recent	underperformance	of	‘clean	energy’	
companies compared with the stock market in general suggests that 
investors now expect the pace of transformation of the energy sector 
will be slower than previously thought. (3)
So does the worldwide economic slowdown warrant letting up 
on measures to arrest climate change? We argue the contrary. 
Tackling climate change globally remains urgent and delay would 
still be costly. If the appropriate mix of policies is adopted, action to 
tackle climate change could form a central part of a fiscal package 
designed to moderate the economic slowdown. The development of 
a low-carbon economy can provide new jobs and new opportunities 
for	innovative	businesses.	A	‘green’	fiscal	stimulus	can	be	a	more	
effective fiscal stimulus, building the foundations for sustainable, 
strong growth in the future, rather than unsustainable bubbles.
This paper first rehearses the argument that a fiscal stimulus, 
particularly a discretionary increase in public spending, is an 
appropriate part of the response in industrial countries in current 
circumstances (alongside an accommodative monetary policy and 
measures	to	mend	the	global	financial	system).	Then	it	considers	
the major elements of a desirable policy framework to stop 
human-induced climate change, assessing how current 
macroeconomic circumstances affect the merits of speeding 
up or slowing their implementation. It then considers how some 
specific	proposals	for	‘green’	spending	perform	against	criteria	
for	an	effective	‘green’	stimulus	and	what	magnitude	that	stimulus	
might be on a global scale.
(1) The reductions are to be measured against a baseline of 1990 levels or, in some cases, 1995 levels.
(2) In the event, these members’ reservations were overcome.
(3) The Wilderhill Clean Energy Index, a global stock index composed mainly of companies that stand to benefit substantially from a transition to clean energy technologies, has fallen about 60% over 
the past year, compared with a fall in the S&P500 of around 35% in the same period.
(4) See Spilimbergo et al (2008). 
(5) This is the proposition of ‘Ricardian equivalence’ – that changes in taxes and debt have the same effect on private consumption. See Barro (1974).
(6) See Lucas (1987).
(7) See the discussion in Krugman (2005).
(8) Barlevy (2005).
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As	the	Institute	for	Fiscal	Studies	(IFS)	has	argued,	a	good	fiscal	
stimulus would be “targeted, timely and temporary”.(17) The second 
two criteria are straightforward. Timeliness is important, because the 
stimulus will be more effective, the sooner it is implemented after the 
initial shocks to demand, moderating the downward multiplier effect 
on domestic investment. The stimulus need only be temporary, 
continuing until asset prices, goods prices, firms and households are 
able to adjust fully to the shocks that have triggered the slowdown. 
Given	the	size	and	unusual	nature	of	the	shocks	in	this	case,	that	
may	take	several	quarters.	But	if	the	stimulus	were	to	last	too	long,	
it	would	risk	pushing	up	default	and	inflation	premia	on	government	
bonds, as investors became more worried about whether the 
government	would	be	able	to	service	its	rising	debt.	As	the	IFS	
points out, though, a temporary stimulus need not entail temporary 
policy	measures;	but	it	does	require	an	exit	strategy	to	finance	any	
long-term policy measures when recovery comes. 
Demonstrating the sustainability of fiscal plans over time is 
particularly important for countries in which the structural 
full-employment	deficit	is	high	or	the	government’s	contingent	
liabilities	are	large,	in	order	to	stop	default	and	inflation	premia	
rising abruptly. Such countries may therefore have less scope 
for discretionary fiscal stimuli, a point made forcefully by Buiter 
(2008).	But	fiscal	sustainability	does	not	necessarily	require	rapid	
stabilization	of	government	debt/GDP	ratios	as	long	as	the	 
long-term fiscal framework is credible.(18)	And	default	and	inflation	
premia do not suggest that lack of long-term credibility has yet 
become a serious problem for industrial countries.(19)
Targeting is a more difficult issue. One criterion is to focus spending 
increases and tax cuts where they would have most effect on 
aggregate	demand	–	where	the	fiscal	multiplier	is	greatest.	That	is	a	
key consideration at the moment, given the urgency of tackling the 
economic downturn. Spending increases do better on this criterion 
than across-the-board tax cuts. Spending increases need to target 
sectors where there are less likely to be bottlenecks from capacity 
constraints or scarcity of specialised skills, and tax cuts need to be 
focused on credit-constrained households and firms. 
But a second criterion is the impact of the stimulus on well-being 
over the longer term. Public spending, for example, needs to be 
considered	in	the	light	of	cost-benefit	analysis,	not	the	size	of	the	
associated fiscal multiplier alone. Digging holes in the road and 
filling	them	in	again	–	the	caricature	of	pure	Keynesian	demand	
management	–	may	be	effective	in	stimulating	demand	as	a	last	
resort, but creating private or public capital that also generates 
returns	over	longer	horizons	is	preferable.	Measures	should	help	to	
provide the conditions to sustain economic growth when it returns, 
by, for example, correcting market failures that inhibit innovation. 
And	there	are	other	social	objectives	(e.g.	poverty	reduction)	that	
need to be included in the assessment.
As	Andersen	(2005)	points	out,	modern	macroeconomic	research	
in	fact	provides	a	rationale	for	an	active	fiscal	stabilization	policy:	
various market failures cause the economy to adjust inappropriately 
to shocks and, to the extent that policy-makers can respond 
to those shocks in a way that private markets cannot, there is 
scope for fiscal policy as long as activity is affected by aggregate 
demand in the short run.(9)	As	many	households	and	firms	are	credit	
constrained,(10) particularly in current circumstances, changes in 
their incomes are more likely to be transmitted to changes in their 
spending.	Andersen	generally	prefers	automatic	stabilizers(11) to 
discretionary	fiscal	policy,	because	the	latter	requires	knowing	a	lot	
about the source of shocks to, and the structure of, the economy. 
But	he	argues	that	it	is	appropriate	“in	the	case	of	‘large’	shocks	
or situations where the economy is caught in an expectations trap 
keeping output at a permanently low level.” The world economy has 
been	subjected	to	large	shocks	recently,	reflected	in	deteriorating	
credit conditions, large asset price falls and slowing world trade.
Empirical evidence
Not only is there a theoretical case to be made for activist fiscal 
policy, there is also empirical evidence in its support. Research 
at the IMF has investigated how effective fiscal policy has been 
in responding to downturns in economic activity, particularly 
recessions.(12) They conclude that the impact of fiscal expansions 
has varied widely across countries and time. They tend to be more 
effective(13)	(i)	when	there	is	excess	capacity,	(ii)	the	economy	is	
relatively	closed,	(iii)	public	spending	is	a	relatively	large	share	of	the	
economy,	and	(iv)	fiscal	expansion	is	accompanied	by	monetary	
expansion.	Conditions	(i),	(iii)	and	(iv)	are	satisfied	for	many	industrial	
countries	at	the	moment,	while	(ii)	is	satisfied	if	one	considers	the	
industrial countries collectively. The authors find little evidence of  
‘crowding	out,’	directly	or	via	interest	rates	or	the	exchange	rate.(14)
The current slowdown is unusual in several respects, such as its 
global reach and the role of credit conditions and the stresses on 
the banking system. That makes past experience a less useful 
guide to how firms and households will react to monetary and fiscal 
policies in current circumstances. For example, are tax cuts more 
likely to be spent, because more people are credit constrained? Or 
are they more likely to be saved, because of heightened concerns 
about debt-laden balance sheets and sharp falls in house prices in 
many countries? Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that fiscal 
expansions can moderate economic slowdowns.
What form should a fiscal stimulus take?
Theory and empirics, then, both support the need for a fiscal 
stimulus	in	the	current	circumstances,	given	the	size	of	the	adverse	
demand shock experienced and the impairment of credit markets. 
But what form should the fiscal stimulus take? 
In general, spending increases are likely to be more effective than 
tax cuts, because some fraction of tax cuts is very likely to 
be	saved.	An	IMF	review	of	OECD	experience	found	that,	for	
spending increases, short-run fiscal multipliers tend to be in the 
range	0.6	to	1.4,	while	for	tax	cuts,	they	tend	to	be	significantly	
lower, lying in the range 0.3 to 0.8.(15) 
Tax cuts are likely to have a larger multiplier effect if they are focused 
on people who are credit constrained (such as people with poor 
income	prospects	and	few	assets	to	offer	as	collateral).	The	current	
funding	difficulties	of	the	developed	world’s	banking	systems	
suggest that the supply of credit has fallen, increasing constraints 
on spending. But if firms and households wish to build up their 
stocks of financial assets or run down their debt, the impact of tax 
cuts will be more muted. To the extent that recipients of tax cuts 
deposit more money in banks, alleviating their funding difficulties, 
tax cuts might help to relax credit constraints. But that might simply 
allow	banks	to	increase	their	stock	of	liquid	assets	rather	than	 
loans to firms and households.
Another	consideration	is	that	tax	cuts	and	increases	in	transfers	
are generally easier to implement swiftly than increased public 
spending on goods and services, particularly if the latter is to be 
properly evaluated and monitored. But tax changes alter important 
relative prices and, for this reason, volatility in tax rates is generally 
inefficient.(16) However, some changes in relative prices may be 
warranted, because of current circumstances (e.g. to encourage 
consumers to bring forward spending from the future by lowering 
prices	today	relative	to	prices	in	the	recovery)	or	because	they	are	 
of merit in their own right, correcting market failures (see later section 
on	carbon	pricing).	And	changes	in	aggregate	spending	by	the	
public sector can also affect relative prices. Given the uncertainties 
at the current point, it makes sense to implement a diverse set 
of measures, but with the emphasis on spending increases.
(9) Andersen also observes that “recent literature devotes very scant attention to fiscal stabilization policy.”
(10) Sarantis and Stewart (2003) estimate that, on average over 20 OECD countries, 70% of households were credit constrained.
(11) The automatic stabilizers are taxes and spending items, such as VAT receipts and unemployment benefit payments, that adjust automatically as the level of activity in the economy varies.
(12) Hemming, Mahfouz and Schimmelpfennig (2002).
(13) Effectiveness is assessed in terms of the size of the fiscal multiplier (the change in total demand for a given change in tax receipts or public spending).
(14) They note that in some very limited circumstances – for example, when fiscal sustainability is in question – a fiscal tightening may stimulate the economy by increasing the government’s 
credibility and releasing resources that are then used by the private sector. But the current levels of real long-term interest rates and unemployment in the major industrial economies do not suggest 
that this is relevant at the moment. 
(15) Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz (2002).
(16) This follows from the convexity of the indirect utility function.
(17) IFS (2008). The IMF discusses a longer list of desiderata relevant to the overall fiscal stimulus: that it should be timely, large, lasting, diversified, contingent on subsequent economic 
developments, collective and fiscally sustainable. See Spilimbergo et al (2008).
(18) Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005).
(19) It is appropriate for policy-makers facing large contingent liabilities to exercise caution, however, given that once bond prices have fallen and Credit Default Swap premia have risen markedly, it 
may be too late to restore credibility.
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3. The need for policies to tackle climate change
That	requires	overcoming	a	number	of	market	failures.	For	example,	
it is well-known that, because knowledge is generally a public good, 
innovations will be under-supplied in a competitive market economy, 
so that in the absence of countervailing policy decarbonisation 
would be much more difficult.(23) This problem is particularly 
acute for the power sector, given its technological and market 
characteristics.(24) 
Another	market	failure	can	arise	when	people	in	a	market	have	
differing amounts of information about the costs and benefits of 
potential investments involving different technologies. For example, 
in the case of landlords and tenants, tenants may be unwilling to 
pay an appropriate share of the costs of home insulation because 
they cannot fully check the costs and long-term benefits of the 
investment. More generally, imperfect information entails capital 
market imperfections that can inhibit any investment that needs 
external finance, as is usually the case with big energy and 
infrastructure	projects.	Lenders	have	to	monitor	what	borrowers’	are	
up	to,	and	this	is	difficult	and	costly	when	the	borrower’s	activities	
are complex. This problem is acute at the moment, because 
uncertainty	about	the	liquidity	and	solvency	of	lenders	 
and borrowers is particularly high. 
Second, pricing the climate change externality. The costs imposed 
by greenhouse gas emissions need to be internalised by those 
responsible for them. This is the rationale for carbon pricing. It 
provides a decentralised and pervasive signal to consumers and 
firms that encourages them to reduce purchases of carbon-intensive 
goods and services and substitute lower-carbon goods and services 
for them, while providing an incentive to develop and deploy low-
carbon technologies and processes.
Third, persuasion. The ethical case for action against climate change 
has to be made and the rationale for particular measures has to be 
explained clearly if climate change policies are to establish and then 
sustain political legitimacy. That is vital, both in its own right and 
in	order	to	provide	stability	in	households’	and	firms’	expectations	
about	future	policy,	given	the	extraordinarily	long	time	horizon	over	
which they will have to operate and the worldwide scope they will 
need to develop.
Fourth, adaptation. The capacity of households and firms to adapt 
to the impacts of climate change needs to be enhanced, given 
the increases in the concentration of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere that have already taken place. The climate system
 adjusts slowly to such increases, so that climatic conditions would 
continue to change even if greenhouse gas emissions were to be 
halted	today.	Much	adaptation	will	not	require,	or	benefit	from,	
government intervention, but public authorities do have to ensure 
that public goods like coastal defences and highway systems 
are	designed	and	built	with	climate	change	in	mind.	And	
governments have a role in producing and disseminating 
information about changes at local level to which firms and 
households will have to adapt. 
Technologies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions
Tackling the market failures that set up barriers to innovation and 
energy efficiency should increase the incentives for businesses to 
invest in research, development and deployment of low-carbon 
technologies and for households and firms to undertake cost-
effective measures to improve the energy efficiency of their activities. 
By unleashing private investment, that can contribute to a fiscal 
stimulus. Initially, there is likely to be a backlog of worthwhile projects 
once market failures have been overcome. So there should be a 
burst of activity followed by a lower, but steady, level of spending 
subsequently.	That	is	a	helpful	time	profile	given	the	need	for	an	
increase in spending in the immediate future.
One way of tackling the market failures is to alter the incentives 
faced by and information available to firms and households. Thus 
putting a price on greenhouse gas emissions provides a pervasive 
incentive to undertake research into ways of reducing them.(25) 
Offering	prizes	for	innovations	that	meet	specific	low-carbon	
objectives is another way of dealing with the under-provision of 
research	and	development	(R&D)	by	providing	a	market	incentive.	
There is also scope for public investments in basic R&D and for the 
linking of basic, intermediate and applied R&D. Providing information 
about how to improve home insulation can help to correct an 
information supply problem, as can the introduction of information 
technology	for	‘smart’	monitoring	of	domestic	energy	use.	
Such measures score well against the criterion of being targeted; 
small increases in public spending can unleash disproportionate 
increases in private sector investment. This is illustrated, for 
example, by Wade et al	(2000)	in	their	review	of	44	energy	efficiency	
programmes in nine EU countries. They find that information and 
education campaigns and innovative institutional programmes had 
succeeded in combining high employment gains, low government 
expenditure and cost-effective investments. Others have suggested 
that information technology can be used more imaginatively 
to help people monitor the impact of their actions on energy 
and carbon usage. 
The provision of information or use of standards-setting to co-
ordinate private-sector actions can be inexpensive, while both 
stimulating investment in the short run and improving the efficiency 
of the economy in the longer term. Designing and implementing 
appropriate policies of this type may be cheap but the policies 
themselves	are	likely	to	be	quite	complex.	Their	success	depends	
on	the	government	having	the	requisite	information	in	the	first	place,	
which points to the advantages of bringing forward plans that have 
already been well formulated. In current circumstances, however, 
there could be a problem with timeliness, if firms and households 
choose	–	for	example,	because	of	credit	constraints	–	to	delay	
making investments even when they appear likely to be profitable in 
the long run. 
The urgency of action against climate change
The	global	economic	downturn	is	concentrating	policy-makers’	
minds on the issue of how to boost economic growth and utilise 
spare resources and unemployed workers. The current crisis, by 
forcing policy-makers to reconsider their economic policies in the 
round, may provide an opportunity to introduce reforms that foster 
enhanced efficiency and more sustainable long-term growth. But 
there is a danger that the challenge of climate change may be put 
aside	if	meeting	it	appears	to	conflict	with	short-run	political	and	
economic objectives. 
However, action on climate change remains urgent. If policy-
makers were to put action off until the impacts of climate change 
forced the issue to the top of the political agenda, the stock 
of greenhouse gases that would have built up in the atmosphere 
would entail severe and increasing risks for many decades. 
If greenhouse gas concentrations are to be stabilised at around 500 
parts per million CO2-equivalent,	global	greenhouse	gas	emissions	
need to start to decline within the next 15 years and to be reduced 
by at least 50% from 1990 levels by 2050. That is a demanding 
target but it makes sense if the risks of dangerous climate change 
are to be avoided, given the current state of scientific knowledge 
(Stern	(2008)).	It	would	reduce	the	chance	of	the	global	mean	
temperature	rising	by	more	than	4˚C	from	pre-industrial	levels	to	
around	one-in-ten,	and	the	chance	of	a	rise	of	more	than	3˚C	to	
less	than	50-50,	according	to	simulations	with	the	Hadley	Centre’s	
climate model. Earlier action by industrial countries is warranted 
because developing countries need to be convinced of the 
technical and political feasibility of a transition to a low-carbon 
economy	before	they	accept	limits	on	their	own	emissions.	And	a	
more demanding target for emissions reductions by the developed 
world is appropriate, given history and its access to resources 
and technologies; it should aim to bring its emissions down by 
at	least	80%.	That	will	require	the	developed	world	as	a	whole	to	
implement	deep	cuts	by	2020,	of	the	order	of	20-40%	relative	 
to 1990 levels, to reach the path to this long-term objective  
and to encourage developing countries to commit to substantial 
emissions reductions themselves.(20) The long-term objective 
would still leave rich countries with above-average per capita 
emissions by 2050.
Yet even with increasing efforts to encourage energy efficiency 
and develop low-carbon technologies, goods and services, in this 
decade greenhouse gas emissions have been increasing at an 
average rate of over 2.5% per year.(21) So the transformation of 
energy	and	transport	systems	has	to	be	accelerated.	And,	given	
the long lives of many of their components, like electric power 
plants, it is important to ensure that near-term investment in their 
infrastructure	does	not	‘lock	in’	high-carbon	technologies	for	
decades to come. 
The prospect of temporary reductions in emissions over the next 
two or three years as a result of the economic slowdown does not 
change that imperative. Insofar as the slowdown leads to delays 
in private sector infrastructure investment (not least due to project 
financing	problems),	it	may	lead	to	higher	emissions	when	the	
economies begin to recover than there would have been otherwise, 
because of the delay to the necessary technological transformation. 
And	the	impact	of	a	single	business	cycle	downturn	on	the	growth	
of the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is unlikely to 
be	large.	Deutsche	Bank	(2008a)	has	revised	down	its	estimate	for	
2008 to 2020 of business-as-usual emissions covered by the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme by just 2.5%. If the global impact 
of	the	downturn	is	similar,	that	amounts	to	only	about	one	year’s	
growth in emissions.
An	additional	impetus	to	policy-makers	comes	from	the	deadline	
provided by the UNFCCC meeting in Copenhagen in December 
2009, which has to formulate a successor to the Kyoto Protocol. 
International collective action on the basis of broadly shared 
long-term objectives is crucial if climate change is to be halted. 
Delays could undermine agreement, damaging the signals crucial  
for fostering and sustaining low-carbon investment, now and 
in the longer term.
The fiscal impact of policies for tackling climate change
So how can the urgency of action on climate change be reconciled 
with the imperative of combating the current economic slowdown? 
The answer is straightforward if action on climate change can also 
help to stimulate the global economy in the short run. Hence the 
question	is,	how	do	climate	change	policies	score	against	criteria	for	
a successful fiscal stimulus, particularly effectiveness in stimulating 
aggregate demand? 
To	answer	that	question,	it	is	helpful	first	to	distinguish	between	
different aspects of climate change policy. There are four main 
elements to a well-designed long-term policy framework for tackling 
climate	change:	(i)	stimulating	the	development	of	low-carbon	
technologies,	(ii)	putting	a	price	on	greenhouse	gas	emissions	to	
reflect	the	costs	that	they	impose,	(iii)	encouraging	people	to	regard	
emissions	as	a	‘bad’,	and	(iv)	promoting	adaptation.	The	first	three	
are	needed	in	order	to	bring	about	–	in	a	cost-effective	way	–	the	
sharp reductions in emissions that are necessary, while the last is 
needed because of the climate change to which the world is already 
committed.	All	require	collective	action	to	some	degree	and	therefore	
warrant the involvement of political institutions.(22)
First, technologies. The production of goods and services has to 
be undertaken in ways that generate much lower greenhouse gas 
emissions. The appropriate methods and technologies to do that 
have to be identified, developed and deployed. 
(20) That does not mean that all industrial countries should take on identical targets for emissions reductions relative to 1990. Countries where emissions have risen a lot over the past 20 years will 
have to achieve the cuts necessary in the long term over four decades rather than six. Other factors such as prospective economic growth, population growth, industrial mix and energy endowments 
will also play a part in determining the pace of individual countries.
(21) An average rate of 2.6% per year for greenhouse gases, measured in terms of CO2-equivalent, from 2000 to 2005, excluding emissions due to land use and forestry, according to the World 
Resources Institute (2009).
(22) See Stern et al (2007).
(23) See Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (2004).
(24) Discussed in Foxon (2003) and Stern et al (2007).
(25) See, for example, Popp (2002) on induced productivity growth in low-carbon technologies in response to energy price changes.
This problem is likely to be exacerbated at the moment by the 
impact of reduced credit availability and lower aggregate demand 
on the viability of firms that have already built up relevant specialist 
knowledge	–	one	reason	why	a	‘green’	stimulus	needs	to	be	
complemented by measures to repair financial intermediation. 
A	second	way	of	tackling	market	failure	is	to	by-pass	the	problem	by	
subsidising private investment, funding public-private partnerships 
or substituting public investment for private in low-carbon initiatives. 
That also has the advantage of demonstrating in hard cash the 
government’s	commitment	to	climate	change	objectives,	building	
the credibility of the policy framework. It makes sense to encourage 
‘lumpy’	investments	that	have	already	passed	project	appraisal	
tests to be brought forward to take advantage of the lower real 
raw	material	costs,	greater	availability	of	labour	and	–	as	long	
as	finance	is	available	–	lower	interest	costs	associated	with	a	
demand-driven slowdown. That could score better on the timeliness 
front, as the impact on spending is less dependent on designing 
and implementing new regulatory schemes and tax incentives 
and	familiarizing	the	private	sector	with	them.	Public	spending	
also relieves or by-passes credit constraints on consumers and 
companies, which are unusually acute in the current slowdown. 
Subsidising the development of renewable energy industries with 
tax breaks for R&D or financing home energy efficiency programmes 
directly are good examples. 
Introducing a long-term framework to tackle climate change 
entails changes in the composition of the capital stock. This 
stock adjustment has a cost, but this cost is lower when there 
is widespread spare capacity, so now is a good time to undertake 
it. The need for a stock adjustment will wane as the existing 
capital	stock,	reflecting	pre-framework	relative	prices	and	
technologies, is replaced.
Spending on the transition to a low-carbon economy also has the 
advantage at a time of rising involuntary unemployment that it is 
likely to increase the demand for labour. The opportunity cost of 
public spending is lower for that reason, so it makes sense to bring 
forward existing public spending programmes where possible. 
Kammen et al	(2006)	point	out	that	renewable	energy	industries	
appear to be more labour intensive than the existing energy sector, 
particularly at the initial construction, manufacture and installation 
stage that is most relevant for a short-term fiscal stimulus.(26) 
Fankhauser et al	(2008)	argue	that	a	shift	from	high-carbon	to	low-
carbon activities is likely to lead to net creation of jobs at present, 
given the estimates of labour intensity in the literature, although there 
is much uncertainty about how labour productivity will evolve and 
about the impact of induced changes elsewhere in the economy.(27) 
Roland-Holst	(2008)	provides	evidence	from	the	lengthy	experience	
of Californian policies that the promotion of energy efficiency 
creates	jobs	(net)	–	of	the	order	of	1.5	million	full-time	equivalent	
(FTE)	jobs	over	the	period	1972-2006	in	California’s	case,	taking	
into account the jobs created by the diversion of spending from 
energy to other goods and services.(28)	Deutsche	Bank	(2008b)	
draws together a range of estimates of job creation that tell the 
same story: measures to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, 
stimulate alternative technologies and save energy can create 
a	substantial	number	of	jobs	over	the	time	horizon	relevant	for	
tackling the current economic downturn, so they can be timely and 
targeted.	The	potential	increase	in	the	demand	for	labour	reflects	
not only the labour intensity of many of the tasks that need to be 
undertaken in the short run, but also the backlog of tasks to be 
done when a new policy framework is brought in (e.g. retrofitting 
the	existing	housing	stock	with	insulation).(29)
In the short run, spending on energy efficiency measures is likely 
to be directed towards domestic construction sector activity and 
hence have a low rate of leakage into imports, increasing the 
domestic	fiscal	multiplier	–	a	potentially	important	consideration	for	
any government that is uncertain about the likely fiscal policies of its 
trading partners. It is less relevant if industrial countries coordinate 
their fiscal measures, which would be particularly valuable in the 
case of measures to encourage low-carbon technologies, in order 
to avoid displacement of carbon-intensive activities to competing 
developed economies. 
Spending to combat climate change is also likely to generate 
ancillary benefits such as an increase in fuel security and a reduction 
in	local	pollution.	And	such	measures	need	not	crowd	out	other	
socially	valuable	investment,	given	the	relatively	small	size	of	the	
energy sector in relation to the economy as a whole (around 5% of 
GDP	in	the	UK)	and	even	more	so	the	relatively	small	scale	of	R&D	
activity	(around	2.5%	of	all	business	R&D	spending	in	the	UK).	They	
could be part of a broader fiscal package. The key consideration 
from the point of view of climate change policies is that other 
measures are not inconsistent with encouraging the transition to 
a low-carbon economy. For example, new schools and hospitals 
should be energy-efficient and the design of new homes, roads and 
bridges should anticipate local climate change. Carbon- and energy-
saving measures are more cost-effective when they are incorporated 
in new infrastructure rather than in retro-fits and repairs. It is also 
important that other spending initiatives do not slow down the 
transition. Hence increased subsidies to conventional energy use, for 
example by price subsidies, would be unhelpful.(30)
One caveat, however, is that more innovative and more capital-
intensive projects are likely to be less timely, because of regulatory 
delays and the need to develop project plans first (for example, 
it may take 30 to 60 months to complete the pre-construction 
phases	of	preparing	a	new	wind	farm).	That	draws	attention	to	the	
desirability of making regulation more efficient and better designed. 
Energy efficiency improvements have an advantage partly because 
of their dependence on known technologies and skills. The same 
applies to some measures to encourage switching to lower-carbon 
fuels	(e.g.	fuel-switching	for	public	transport	vehicles).
Setting a carbon price
Carbon prices are already being set in the European Union, directly 
through	the	Emissions	Trading	Scheme	(ETS)	and	various	taxes,	
and indirectly through other environmental policies such as the 
UK Renewables Obligation. Other countries and regions have 
been adopting similar schemes. Yet the progress on institutional 
developments contrasts with recent price movements. The carbon 
price under the EU ETS has fallen by around 60% since its peak in 
July 2008. The price of carbon in Clean Development Mechanism 
transactions is also low. That represents a weakening of the 
incentive	to	reduce	carbon-intensive	activities.	It	may	reflect	in	part	
the	sale	of	quotas	by	otherwise	credit-constrained	firms	that	need	to	
raise funds.(31) Is now the time to seek to push up the price?
Economic modelling of efforts to slow climate change suggests 
that the carbon price should rise steadily. There are four lines of 
argument: 
(i) The social cost of carbon rises steadily as the marginal costs of 
emissions	rise	with	the	size	of	the	stock	of	greenhouse	gases	already	
in the atmosphere.(32) Year-to-year volatility in emissions (as opposed 
to	a	change	in	trend	growth)	is	unlikely	to	have	a	significant	effect	
because it has little effect on the overall stock of greenhouse gases 
or ultimate damage costs. 
(ii)	Adopting	an	ultimate	target	for	stabilising	global	greenhouse	gas	
concentrations (the way in which policy is often characterised in the 
economic	models)	creates,	in	effect,	an	exhaustible	natural	resource	
(the	ability	to	emit	carbon).	Hotelling’s	principle	means	that	the	price	
of this resource should increase at the real rate of interest.(33) 
(iii) In a world of uncertainty, fixing the trajectory of the price of 
carbon in the short to medium term is preferable to sticking to a 
trajectory for emissions in the face of shocks.(34) 
(iv) Expectations of a long-run rise in the carbon price are necessary 
if near-term investment in long-lived infrastructure and in R&D is to 
avoid	‘locking	in’	high-carbon	technologies.
Carbon	pricing	is	also	necessary	to	combat	the	‘rebound’	effect	
from successful energy efficiency promotion. If there are low costs, 
or indeed negative costs, associated with many energy efficiency 
measures,	as	argued	by	McKinsey	&	Company	(2009),	they	are	
likely to lower the cost of energy-intensive activities and increase 
disposable incomes. Both factors will tend to boost consumption  
of those activities in the absence of a countervailing increase  
in carbon prices.
Economic theory therefore gives cause for concern about the sharp 
fall in the carbon price. It is failing to give the appropriate steady, 
long-run signal to investors about the economic costs of high-
carbon technologies and to customers about the true costs of their 
purchases. The falls since last summer in the prices of oil and other 
hydrocarbons, brought about by the economic downturn, have also 
diminished the short-term attractiveness of low-carbon investment, 
goods and services.
However, previous analysis has largely abstracted from business 
cycle considerations and the relationship of the carbon price to 
other	asset	prices.	An	increase	in	the	carbon	price,	by	imparting	
an adverse supply shock to the industrial sectors covered, would 
impede economic stimulus measures. Firms are unable to adjust 
their inputs, outputs and capital stocks immediately in response to 
relative prices changes. Nor does it appear to be necessary in order 
to keep emissions within the limits set by the EU ETS, given that the 
quota	price	is	determined	in	the	market	place	with	a	fixed	supply	
of	quotas.	And	the	continuing	increase	in	the	volumes	traded	on	
carbon	markets	suggests	that	deep	and	liquid	markets	are	being	
established, which should help build confidence in their use and their 
efficiency	in	reflecting	expectations	about	the	future.(35) Measures 
to raise the carbon price are of less urgency at a time of economic 
downturn, as long as the long-term trajectory is not brought into 
question	by	its	current	low	level.
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(26) Such activities need not necessarily be more labour intensive in the longer term. That depends on the scope for economies of scale and ‘learning by doing’ as technologies mature.
(27) Decarbonising the global economy might therefore change the long-run shares of capital and labour in total income. But whether it will act as a countervailing force to globalisation and the 
impact of overal technological change depends on a range of factors, not least its impact on the demand for skilled, as opposed to unskilled, workers.
(28) At state level, employment creation in the United States is facilitated by the ease with which workers can migrate across state borders. In a more closed economy, measures similar to the 
Californian ones might be expected to create fewer jobs because aggregate supply would be less responsive.
(29) Public spending on the transition to a low-carbon economy provides an opportunity to address social needs as well as economic and environmental ones e.g. reducing the high energy costs 
(relative to income) of low-income families in poor-quality, energy-inefficient housing. 
(30) This is not acknowledged by all governments. The Mexican authorities, for example, are reported to be planning to cut the domestic gas price by 10%, cap petrol prices for the rest of the year, 
and reduce electricity tariffs.
(31) That illustrates how the carbon price reacts differently to macroeconomic shocks under a quota system than under a carbon tax regime. It seems unlikely that a fiscal authority with a carbon tax 
would, as part of a fiscal stimulus, cut one particular tax rate to such an extent – broader, more neutral tax reductions would almost certainly be preferred.
(32) The marginal impact of a given quantity of emissions on expected global mean temperature declines with the stock of greenhouse gases, but the marginal impact of temperature changes 
on expected climate-change costs rises with temperature. Whether the social cost of carbon goes up or down with the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere depends on which factor 
dominates. The risks of catastrophic changes at high temperatures suggest to us that the later factor dominates.
(33) The ‘natural resource’ in question, the permission to pollute, is costless to exploit in the sense that its use does not require other resource use, unlike, say, coal, which has to be dug out of the 
ground. See Dasgupta and Heal (1979).
(34) Pizer (2002). That is not inconsistent with targeting the quantity of emissions in the longer term, as explained in Stern et al (2007), pages 354-358.
(35) Deals under the Clean Development Mechanism, however, have slowed.
Building support for the climate change policy framework
Building the ethical and economic case for the climate change policy 
framework becomes more urgent at a time of a downturn like the 
present	one.	First,	the	choice	of	‘green’	fiscal	measures	needs	to	be	
explained and justified. Second, the burdens on firms imposed by 
even a reduced carbon price could otherwise erode support for the 
framework as a whole. Third, the ground needs to be prepared for 
climate change policies during the eventual economic recovery. 
Stopping	climate	change	requires	persistence	over	the	long	term	
in technology and carbon pricing policies. It is argued in previous 
sections that now is a good time to introduce stronger support for 
energy efficiency and renewable technologies in particular, but, given 
the nature of the relevant market failures, the need for this support 
will not evaporate when economic growth recovers. Without public 
support for the framework, putting in place financing measures for 
‘green’	public	spending	and	establishing	the	long-term	credibility	of	
incentives for investment in low-carbon infrastructure will be difficult. 
The	danger	is	that	the	argument	for	a	‘green’	fiscal	stimulus	will	be	
turned on its head when an overall stimulus is no longer necessary. 
Just as the government needs to outline a convincing strategy for 
consolidating the public finances once economic recovery is under 
way, it needs to continue to make the case for a long-term strategy 
against climate change.
Adaptation to climate change
The final element of a strong climate change policy framework is 
the	promotion	of	society’s	ability	to	adapt	to	the	impacts	of	climate	
change. One way of doing that is to ensure that when the public 
sector provides long-lived public goods, or gives incentives to the 
private sector to provide them, these public goods are appropriate 
to	the	changing	climate.	A	fiscal	stimulus	is	likely	to	entail	increased	
investment in infrastructure, given the lower opportunity costs of 
public investment at a time of demand-induced unemployment; it 
is	important	that	this	infrastructure	is	‘climate-proofed’.	That	is	likely	
to	entail	higher	spending	(e.g.	on	more	substantial	flood	protection	
and	better	insulated	schools),	as	adaptation	is	not	costless.	But	
much adaptation will have to await greater clarity about the local 
impacts of climate change and their timing; many will not be felt for 
a generation or more. Given the lags between emissions and climate 
change damages, and the uncertainty surrounding the precise 
nature and incidence of the damages, action is more urgent on the 
emission-reduction front.
Many	specific	proposals	for	‘green’	spending	are	under	discussion	
as government plans for fiscal stimuli are further developed around 
the world. This paper has suggested some criteria that could be 
used to assess their potential benefits, both in aiding economic 
recovery in the near term and in tackling climate change over the 
long	haul.	In	Table	1,	we	offer	our	own	qualitative	assessment	of	
various recommendations for action, drawing on a range of sources 
including	the	Committee	on	Climate	Change	(2008)	for	the	UK,	
and Pollin et al	(2008)	and	the	proposals	in	the	current	American	
Recovery and Reinvestment Bill for the United States. 
The first criterion is timeliness	–	the	extent	to	which	a	significant	
proportion of the associated spending would be likely to be carried 
out over the next year or so. The next four relate to how well such 
measures are targeted: 
(i) potential long-term social returns (with respect to climate 
change	objectives),
(ii)	positive	‘lock-in’	effects	from	investment	in	long-lived	low-carbon	
capital stock,
(iii)	likely	extent	of	job	creation	and	size	of	the	domestic	fiscal	multiplier,
(iv) use of under-utilised resources. 
The	first	two	of	these	focus	on	the	measures’	likely	effectiveness	
as policies to tackle climate change, while the second two focus 
on their likely effectiveness as part of a fiscal stimulus. The sixth 
heading relates to the criterion of time-limitedness: the extent to 
which spending is likely to be shifted forward in time, reducing 
necessary spending later on. Measures that are additional and/
or likely to be permanent place a greater onus on policy-makers to 
engage with the issue of fiscal sustainability.
This informal assessment draws attention to the potential of energy 
efficiency measures to deliver a fiscal stimulus and to help deliver 
climate change objectives. They are also useful from the point of 
view of enhancing energy security and reducing fuel poverty. Several 
initiatives in the transport sector look especially attractive as well. 
Large-scale new infrastructure investments are less obviously an 
effective tool for short-term economic recovery.
Our emphasis has been on criteria for assessing individual measures 
–	a	‘bottom-up’	approach.	It	is	difficult	to	judge	precisely	how	large	
a	contribution	to	the	global	fiscal	stimulus	is	implied.	HSBC	(2009)	
note that plans announced so far vary widely in the extent that they 
explicitly	promote	‘green’	investment,	ranging	(in	HSBC’s	assessment)	
from 0% in Poland to 69% in South Korea. Given the uncertainties 
about the fiscal multipliers for different tax and spending changes 
in current circumstances, any fiscal stimulus package needs to be 
diversified.	There	are	limits	to	the	extent	to	which	‘green’	investments	can	
be	scaled	up,	given	the	size	of	the	sectors	in	which	they	would	be	made.	
However, some guidance can be obtained from estimates of the 
costs and likely impacts of coherent sets of measures built up from 
a	‘bottom	up’	approach.	For	example,	for	the	United	States,	Pollin	et 
al	(2008)	propose	a	set	of	public	infrastructure	investments	in	public	
building	retrofits,	low-carbon	public	transportation,	building	‘smart’	
electricity grid systems and developing wind power, solar power 
and	next-generation	biofuels;	that	would	entail	a	US$100	billion	
programme	over	two	years	–	equivalent	to	around	0.75%	of	one	
year’s	GDP.	They	estimate	that	it	would	create	some	two	million	jobs.
(36) Since its publication, the economic outlook has deteriorated 
further and the scale of the likely United States stimulus has 
increased, so a more ambitious United States programme now 
appears	reasonable.	HSBC	estimates	that	about	US$130	billion	
(16%)	of	the	current	United	States	Economic	Stimulus	Package	
comprises	‘green’	investment	of	one	sort	or	another.
At	a	global	level,	a	fiscal	stimulus	greater	than	the	2%	of	GDP	
suggested	by	the	IMF’s	Managing	Director	in	December	2008	is	
now warranted, given that the Fund in January 2009 revised down 
its world growth forecast for 2009 by 1.75 percentage points, 
despite the fiscal packages already announced. (37)	A	case	can	be	
made	for	an	effort	of	the	order	of	4%	of	GDP,	given	the	likely	size	
of	the	fiscal	multipliers.	With	annual	world	GDP	of	around	US$55	
trillion, (38)	that	suggest	a	figure	of	upwards	of	US$2	trillion.	Overall,	
we	suggest	that	a	‘green’	stimulus	of	the	order	of	20%	of	the	total	
would be appropriate (higher in countries with a lot of unexploited 
opportunities for low-cost decarbonisation, lower in countries that 
have	already	made	a	significant	start	in	this	direction).	That	gives	a	
‘ball-park’	figure	of	some	US$400	billion	of	extra	public	spending	
worldwide	on	‘green’	measures	over	the	next	year	or	so.(39) 
To	put	that	number	in	context,	McKinsey	&	Company	(2009)	
estimates	that	the	annual	incremental	investment	costs	required	to	
get the global economy on to an appropriate low-carbon trajectory(40) 
would be EUR 320 billion by 2015, a very similar order of magnitude. 
McKinsey & Company does not envisage that that would need to 
be funded wholly by the public sector. But in 2009, the near-term 
outlook for private-sector investment spending is poor and the 
public	sector	will	have	to	bear	a	larger	share	of	the	burden.	And	it	
was argued in previous sections that some incremental investment 
should be brought forward from future years and that there is a 
backlog	of	projects	to	work	through.	So	the	‘ball-park’	figure	is	
broadly consistent with the McKinsey & Company estimate of the 
scale	of	the	‘green’	effort	needed	to	achieve	the	long-term	policy	
goal. It is also in line with the incremental costs of power generation 
that	the	International	Energy	Agency	suggests	will	be	required	for	
greenhouse	gas	abatement	(IEA	(2008)).(41) Much further work is 
required	on	the	details	of	what	it	should	comprise.	But	an	initiative	of	
that magnitude would go a long way towards setting the world on a 
long-term trajectory of more sustainable, low-carbon growth.
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4.  Proposals for ‘green’ spending in the 
current crisis
(36) The authors use input-output tables to derive direct and indirect employment effects of the first round of spending increases, and apply a fiscal multiplier towards the low end of the estimates for 
the United States reported in Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz (2002). They also point out that investments in such areas would provide jobs across a broad range of familiar occupations, and so would be 
unlikely to be inhibited by bottlenecks in the supply of highly specialised workers.
(37) That follows a downward revision of 0.75 percentage point in November 2008.
(38) The World Bank estimate for world GDP at market prices for 2007 was US$54.3 trillion.
(39) 20% of 3.6% of annual world GDP. That would take more than a year to disburse.
(40) 54% reduction in greenhouse gases (CO2-equivalent) relative to the business-as-usual scenario by 2030 (30% reduction relative to the 2005 level of emissions).
(41) It is also broadly in line with the extra investment flows needed annually by 2030 in the UNFCCC’s mitigation scenario relative to its reference scenario, if one does not deduct the investment 
spending saved by 2030 by reducing fossil fuel generation and supply, and having a smaller transmission and distribution capital stock (UNFCCC (2007)).
Mitigation target
Power generation
Renewable energy promotion, 
e.g. through accelerated 
planning process
Nuclear power, e.g. through 
accelerated planning process
Carbon capture and storage 
demonstration projects
Upgrade to smart  
electricity grid 
Advanced	battery	
development
Transport
Supply-side efficiency in new 
cars,	vans	and	HGVs	(g/km)
Switch to cleaner cars / 
fleet	renewal	e.g.	through	
stronger Vehicle Excise Duty 
differentiation
Connected urban 
transportation including road 
traffic management systems 
and work patterns
Supply-side efficiency in rail 
(engines,	rolling	stock)
Mass transit and rail freight
Car efficiency standards
Tyre check 
Reducing emissions from 
deforestation
and forest degradation
Afforestation,	expanding	
and developing parkland, 
wetlands and rural 
ecosystems
Investment 
approach
Private 
Private
Mixed public / 
private
Public with some 
clawback via tariffs
Private with 
incentives
Private with 
incentives
Private with 
incentives
Mixed public / 
private
Private with 
incentives
Mixed public / 
private
Private with 
incentives
Private with 
incentives
Private with 
incentives
Timeliness 
(‘shovel-ready’)
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
2
1
3
3
Long-term 
social return
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
2
Positive lock-
in effects
3
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
2
3
Domestic 
multiplier/ job 
creation
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
2
2
3
2
3
3
Targeting 
areas with 
slack
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
2
2
3
2
2
2
Time-limited/ 
reversibility
3
3
1
3
1
3
1
1
3
1
3
3
2
An outline of the case for a ‘green’ stimulus 1514
Table 1: Assessing selected proposals to combat climate change
Scores (1 = worst; 3 = best)
Mitigation target
Buildings and industry
Residential energy efficiency 
(lofts	etc),	either	utility-driven	
or local-authority-driven
Energy efficiency measures 
for public buildings
Boiler replacement 
programme
Lights and appliances,  
e.g. utility-driven
Renewable heat / fuel switch 
(e.g.	solar,	biomass)
Micro-generation (wind, 
biomass),	e.g.	through	 
feed-in system
Smart production (increase 
energy efficiency, monitor, 
meter and regulate delivery 
and consumption of energy 
and	inputs)
Smart infrastructure and 
buildings	–	increase	energy	
efficiency, monitor, meter 
and regulate delivery and 
consumption of energy  
and water 
Encouraging energy R&D 
(doubling	percentage	of	GDP)
Industrial energy efficiency /
mitigation, e.g. combined 
heat and power
Investment 
approach
Mixed public / 
private
Mixed public / 
private
Private with 
incentives
Private with 
incentives
Private with 
incentives
Private or mixed 
public / private
Private with 
incentives
Mixed public / 
private
Mixed public / 
private
Private or mixed 
public / private
Timeliness 
(‘shovel-ready’)
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
Long-term 
social return
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
Positive lock-
in effects
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
Domestic 
multiplier/ job 
creation
3
3
3
3
2
2
1
2
2
2
Targeting 
areas with 
slack
3
3
3
3
3
2
1
2
1
1
Time-limited/ 
reversibility
3
3
3
3
2
1
1
1
1
3
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There is a strong theoretical and empirical case for a fiscal stimulus 
in	the	industrial	countries	at	present.	The	question	is,	what	form	
should it take? We argue that this is the right time to be spending 
on measures to promote energy efficiency and low-carbon 
technologies, given the urgency of the case for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. Such spending would be effective in creating jobs 
within	the	appropriate	time	frame	–	well-targeted	and	timely.	It	is	
also important to ensure that investments in public infrastructure 
undertaken	as	part	of	the	fiscal	stimulus	enhance	the	economy’s	
capacity to adapt to climate change. Installing infrastructure that 
locks in high greenhouse gas emissions for many years to come 
will increase the difficulties of reducing emissions in the future and 
blunt the incentives for technological improvement and innovation. 
Decisions about the scale and composition of fiscal expansions are 
needed as soon as possible if they are to play their role in preventing 
a slide into a global depression. Governments need to commit to 
a	strong	‘green’	element	in	a	fiscal	recovery	plan	in	the	first	half	of	
2009	or	indeed	the	first	quarter.	
It is less urgent for there to be a rise in the carbon price, as that does 
not	appear	to	be	necessary	to	meet	quantity	targets	for	emissions	
in the near term and might erode support for the overall climate 
policy framework. But it is vital that the rationale for a comprehensive 
framework to reduce emissions is explained and the case for it 
made vigorously, given the eventual need to reconcile continuing 
measures against climate change with fiscal consolidation. If people 
become convinced that the framework will hold in the long term, 
that	could	unleash	a	wave	of	creativity	and	innovation	in	‘greening’	
the	economy	–	a	more	durable	foundation	for	economic	growth	than	
dot.com booms and housing bubbles.
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